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LIABILITY OF DIRECTOR TO CORPORATION

CORPORATION'S RIGHT TO PROFITS MADE BY
DIRECTORS
JUST how far a director's duty to his corporation operates to
prevent him from entering into private transactions which might
have been advantageously entered into by his corporation, is
not only an interesting legal question but one ever recurring
and of grave importance in modem business. Undoubtedly
there is a large field for individual activity lying outside the duty
of the director and still within the scope of the corporate business.1 A recent Illinois decision goes into this "No Man's
Land" lying between the director's duty to his corporation and
his right as an individual to promote his own interests, and
seems at first glance to restrict materially the director's personal business freedom. A corporation had entered into a contract with certain persons under which the corporation secured
a license to manufacture and sell certain patented articles, paying as royalties therefor a per cent of the gross receipts from
sales. Certain directors of the corporation privately purchased
the licensor's royalty rights for their own benefit, without disclosing to the corporation the opportunity to make the purchase
although the corporation was financially in a position to take
advantage of it. The court held that the directors were not
entitled to collect from the corporation any royalties beyond the
amount necessary to reimburse them for the purchase price,
apparently on the ground that they were to be deemed as having
2
purchased the contract rights in trust for the corporation.
It is everywhere agreed that a director occupies a fiduciary
relation to his corporation. 3 But although the courts and writers
speak of the director as a trustee for his corporation and for the
body of the stockholders, 4 they are not in accord as to the extent

1
See note 13 Col. L. R. 431, 432; 4 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp., sec. 2282.
2

Farwell v. Pyle-National Electric Headlight Co., (Ill. 1919) 124 N. E.
449.4 2 Machen,
Modern Law of Corp., sec. 1564; Perry on Trusts,
6th
ed., 4 sec. 207.
Hoffman Steam Coal Co. v. Cumberland Coal & Iron Co., (1860) 16
Md. 456, 77 Am. Dec. 311; Taylor v. Mitchell, (1900) 80 Minn. 492, 83
N. W. 418; Hooker v. Midland Steel Co., (1905) 215 Ill. 444, 451, 74
N. E. 445, 106 A. S. R. 170; 10 Cyc. 787.
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of the trusteeship or of the duty this imposes upon him with
respect to transactions where his individual interests may rival
the interests of his corporation. It was contended in the recent
Illinois case that the mere fact that an investment would be
beneficial to the corporation, the corporation being in a position
to take advantage of it, raises a duty in the director to offer it
to his company before taking it for himself. Statements in
text-books5 and dicta of judges, appear to support this contention, but the cases therein cited do not bear them out. For in each
of the cases cited there was not only an investment which would
have been to the interests of the corporation, but the corporation,
by its nature or otherwise, had been actually committed to the
investment, to the director's knowledge, so that he was under
a specific duty to procure it for his corporation or at least to
give it the first opportunity to make the investment.7 In one of
these cases the distinction is clearly brought out by the peculiar
facts of the case. A quarrying corporation which held an undivided one-third interest in certain quarry lands and a lease of
another third of the same lands, secured a contract for the
conveyance of the leased one-third as soon as good title could
be-given. Two directors of the corporation purchased for themselves the outstanding one-third interest and also the title to the
leased one-third. The court declared the directors trustees for
the benefit of the corporation as to the leased one-third but
refused to do so as to the remaining one-third although it would
have been to the corporation's interest to buy it, and although
the corporation had previously tried to purchase it, and the
directors gained an appreciation of its value through their position as directors, the court saying:
52 Machen, Modern Law of Corp., sec. 1620; 3 Pomeroy's Equity
Jur., 4th ed., sec. 1077; Cook, Corp., 6th ed., sec. 660.
8 Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., (N. Y. 1919) 123 N. E. 148;
Leader Pub. Co. v. Grant, etc., Co., (1915) 182 Ind. 651, 108 N. E. 121.
7 These cases in which directors were -held as trustees for the company, were of directors purchasing or leasing for themselves when commissioned to purchase or lease for the corporation; claiming investments
for themselves when made as corporate officers in corporate employ and
apparently with corporate money; acquiring for themselves property known
to be essential to the existence of the corporation, or to carry out its
objects; acquiring property for themselves and thereby ousting the corporation of a valuable property right, or of a valuable expectancy of
acquisition or of renewal of a lease. See cases cited in footnote 5, (p.
1340) to sec. 1620, Machen, II, supra; and in footnote 1, (p. 1340) to
sec. 660, Cook, II, supra. When the corporation has resolved to make
a certain investment, the director cannot go out and secure it for himself.
Kroegher v. Calivada Coloniz. Co.. (1902) 119 Fed. 641; Acker, etc., Co.
v. McGraw, (1907) 106 Md..536, 68 Atl. 17.
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"Good faith to the corporation does not require of its
officers that they steer from their own to the corporation's benefit enterprises or investments which, though capable of profit
to the corporation, have in no way become subject to their trust
or duty."8

This, though perhaps an extreme case; illustrates the prevailing tendency which the court in a later case thus expressed:
"Whether in any case an officer of a corporation is in duty
bound to purchage property for the corporation, or to refrain
from purchasing property for himself, depends upon whether
the corporation has an interest, actual or in expectancy, in the
property, or whether the purchase of the property by the officer
or director may hinder or defeat the plans and purposes of the
corporation in the carrying on or development of the legitimate
business for which it was created.""
Some writers have gone so far as to say that the director
will be held to have taken the property in trust for the corporation only when he was under a present specific duty to purchase the property for the corporation.1 0 It is submitted that
this inaccurately states the question, which is rather whether
he was under a duty to offer the investment to his corporation
and give it the opportunity to accept or refuse before taking it
for himself ;" and that the test as to whether there was such a
duty depends upon whether, as between the director and the
corporation, the opportunity belonged to. the corporation, on
account of the necessities of its business, or some definite action
already taken by it or by another in proposals to it. If the
transaction is not so appropriated to the corporation, it would
seem that the director may legally take it for himself.1 2 Although
he is always required to use the utmost good faith when dealing
with his corporation, a director certainly should not be required
to become a self-sacrificing "Good Samaritan" in handing
business over to it, simply because such business would be beneficial to it.
Before proceeding to a discussion of transactions where
the director has purchased rights under an assignment of a cons Lagarde v. Anniston, etc., Co.. (1900) 126 Ala. 496, 502, 28 So. 199.
9 Zeckendorf v. Steinfeld, (1909) 12 Ariz. 245, 262, 100 Pac. 784; see
also a very similar statement in Lagard.e v. Anniston, etc., Co., (1900) 126
Ala. 496, 502, 28 So. 199.
10 See note 13 Col.. L. R. 431 at 432; also 4 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp., sec.
2282.
"When the corporation is clearly unable to enter upon the transaction, the reason for the rule is zone and the director's specific duty does
not arise. Crittendon & Cowler Co. v. Cowler, (1901) 66 N. Y. App.
Div. 95; see McDermott Mining Co. v. McDermott, (1902) 27 Mont. 143,
69 Pac. 715.
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tract to which the corporation is a party, it is necessary to notice
a difference often apparent between the basis for raising a constructive trust where the director has purchased a contract right
against his corporation and the basis for the trust where he has
merely purchased property which would have been beneficial to
the corporation. The constructive trust, of course, arises in
both cases from the breach of some duty growing out of the
fiduciary relationship. But where fhe circumstances are not
such as to have entitled the corporation to priority, the basis for
raising the constructive trust must arise, if at all, from other
considerations, and must rest in the principle that equity will
not permit a director to place himself in a position where his
personal interests are adverse to the best interests of his corporation and where those interests may lead him to take advantage of his official position as a director' to advance his own
interests to the prejudice of the corporation. He is under a duty
to refrain from engaging in transactions which will so place
him. It must be apparent, however, that this doctrine ordinarily
cannot be invoked in the case of purchases of real or personal
property, while it often can and should be invoked where the
director has, by assignment, become a party to an executory
contract with his corporation.
Transactions involving the assignment to the director of a
contract with his corporation may be divided for the purposes
of this discussion into two general classes: (1) liquidated
claims, and (2) valuable executory contracts and unliquidated
claims. The courts regard the former, at least, in the same
light as purchases of property, which in fact they are, and
where a constructive trust is imposed, allow the director to realize from his venture no more than is necessary to reimburse
him for what he has actually paid.13 The cases of this type
usually arise where the director has purchased a claim against
his corporation at a discount and is attempting to enforce it at
its face value. Since the situation is practically the same as
where he has purchased property which he desires to realize a
12 In such case the fact that the director gained an appreciation of his
bargain because of his connection with his company raises no such duty.
Lagarde v. Anniston, etc., Co., (1900) 126 Ala. 496, 28 So. 199; Zeckendorf v. Steinfeld, (1909) 12 Ariz. 245, 100 Pac. 784; although this
should be carefully distinguished from the use for personal advantage
of corporate knowledge entrusted to him as a corporate officer. See Du
Pont v. Du Pont, (1907) 242 Fed. 98, 136.
13 Kroegher v. Calivada Coloniz. Co.. (1902) 119 Fed. 641; The Telegraph v. Lee, (1904) 125 Ia. 17, 98 N. W. 364.

LIABILITY OF DIRECTOR TO CORPORATION

profit upon, it would seem that he should be permitted to enforce
the claim at par when due, unless facts are shown to have existed
which appropriated the investment to the corporation and imposed upon the director in the exercise of good faith the duty
to offer it to his corporation before buying it in personally. In
line with this view, the weight of authority supports the purchase
by directors of corporate securities from third persons at a
discount and their enforcement against the corporation at par,
provided the directors owed no present duty to discharge or
buy them;1 and the better text writers 15 and a majority of the
courts support the purchase by directors of general debts of the
corporation tinder the same conditions.'8
The contrary view is stated by Cook in his work on Corporations, in which he limits the rule to bonds, saying:
"It is a fraud on the corporation and corporate creditors
for directors to buy up at a discount outstanding debts of 7the
corporation and compel it to pay the full face value thereof."'
A majority of the cases he cites to sustain this statement
were of directors who bought up claims against their corporation when it was insolvent.18 It is, of course, well settled that
a director of an insolvent corporation cannot buy up outstanding obligations at a discount and enforce them at par, thus
working a preference in his behalf to the prejudice of creditors
for whom he then stands as a quasi-trustee. 19 A few early
cases, however, hold squarely that whenever a director buys
obligations against his corporation at a discount, the purchase
inures to the benefit of the corporation ;20 and the reasoning of
14Seymour v. Spring Forest Cemetery Ass'n., (1895) 144 N. Y. 333,
344, 39 N. E. 365, 26 L. R. A. 859; Camden Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v.
Citizens Ice & Storage Co., (1905) 69 N. J.Eq. 718, 61 Atl. 529, aff'd 71
N. J.Eq. 221, 65 At. 980. Yet contrary intimations are sometimes found.
See 10 Cyc. 798.

15 Morawetz, Priv. Corp., sec. 521; Machen, Modern Law of Corp.,
sec. 81623.
' Inglehart v. Thousand Is. H. Co., (1884) 32 Hun (N.Y.) 377, 383;
St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Chenault, (1886) 36 Kan. 51, 22 Pac. 303; Glenwood Mfg. Co. v. Syme, (1901) 109 Wis. 355, 85 N. W. 432; McIntyre
v. Ajax Min. Co., (1904) 28 Utah 162, 171, 77 Pac. 613; Martin v. Chambers, (1914) 214 Fed. 769.
1"2 Cook, Corp., 6th ed., sec. 660.
18 As Bulkley v. Whitcomb, (1890) 121 N. Y. 107, 24 N. E. 13. See
cases cited in footnote, (p. 1949) to sec. 660, Cook, supra.
'19Bulkley v. Whitcomb, (1890) 121 N. Y. 107, 24 N. E. 13; Bonney
v. Tilley, (1895) 109 Cal. 346, 42 Pac. 439. See Martin v. Chambers,
(1914) 214 Fed. 769 (dictum), and Morawetz, Corp., sec. 787.
20 Hill v. Frazier, (1853) 22 Pa. St. 320; Moses v. Ocoee Bank, (1878)
1 Lea (Tenn.) 398, follows strict rule but disapproves; Davis v. Rock
Creek, etc., Co., (1880) 55 Cal. 359, 36 Aim Rep. 40; Bramblett v. Com.
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these cases would seem to apply as well to bonds as to other
obligations. They are based on the principle to which reference
has already been made, that a director is a trustee and cannot
be allowed to acquire interests adverse to his cestuis. 21 The
reason for the application of the principle was that equity would
not allow a director to take part in a transaction which might
tempt him to make use of the power of his official position to
injure his corporation for the advancement of his personal
interests. As more and more of the business of the country
has come to be carried on by corporations' it has become evident
that the application of this strict trust accountability rule unwisely limits the activities of directors and is impracticable.
And since the reason for the rule can hardly be said to be present where the corporation is solvent and the claim is a liquidated
amount fixed before the director purchased it, the courts have
gradually relaxed the rule22 in such cases to the end that the
directors be given the greatest possible freedom compatible with
23
strict fairness to the corporation.
& Lumber Co., (1904) 26 Ky. L. Rep. 1176, 83 S. W. 599; (1905) 27 Ky.
L. Rep. 156, 84 . W. 545, is the only late case found which clings to the
strict trustee view.
21 "A trustee . . . cannot buy up a debt or encumbrance to which
the trust estate is liable, for less than is actually due thereon, and make
a profit to himself." Perry, Trusts, 6th ed., sec. 428. See Davis v. Rock
Creek, etc., Co., (1880) 55 Cal. 359, 36 Am. Rep. 40; Bramblett v. Com.
& Lumber Co., (1904) 26 Ky. L. Rep. 1176, 83 S. W. 599; 27 Ky. L. Rep.
156, 84 S. W. 545; 10 Cyc. 798.
22This gradual relaxation from strict trustee accountability is evidenced by the changed view taken by the courts toward direct contracts
by directors with their corporations. Thus it was originally held that
such contracts were voidable regardless of their fairness; Munson v.
S. G. & C. Ry. Co., (1886) 103 N. Y. 58, 8 N. E. 355; see leading Scotch
case of Aberdeen Ry. Co. v. Blaikie Bros., (1886) 1 Macqueen 461;
later such contracts while prima facie voidable when proved fair have
been held-valid in the United States, if the director's vote was not necessary to procure the corporation's acceptance; Schnittger v. Old Home,
etc., Co., (1904) 144 Cal. 603, 78 Pac. 9; and the modern tendency is
that even though the interested directors' votes are necessary to procure its acceptance, such a contract, if proved fair, is valid. Minn. Loan
& Trust Co. v. Peteler Car -Co., (1916) 132 Minn. 277, 156 N. W. 255.
The last case is a far cry from the early view.
23 In the recent Illinois case it was stated that, "If it is for the interest of the corporation to buy its bonds at a discount, and it is financially able to do so, a director will not be permitted to buy those bonds
at a discount and enforce payment in full against the corporation."
This statement was supported by reference to two previous Illinois cases
in which there were dicta to this general effect, but in both cases there were
other circumstances which clearly raised the specific duty to offer the corporation first chance. Higgins v. Lansingh, (1895) 154 Ill. 301, 40 N. E.
362; Harts v. Brown, (1875) 77 Ill. 226. No reason is seen here why the
bare fact that the purchase of the obligation might be beneficial to the
corporation which is in a position to make it should raise a duty in the
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It should be noticed, however, that where the claim has
reached maturity before the director has purchased, there are
strong reasons for holding that the purchase is appropriated
to the corporation and that the director therefore violates a
present specific duty when he purchases for himself without
first offering the opportunity to his corporation, since the cor24
poration is under a present existing obligation to pay the claim.
The purchase by directors of valuable executory contracts
and unliquidated claims against their corporation, on the other
hand, creates a relatioiship in which the rights and duties of the
parties are not always definitely fixed beyond the power of the
director to change. That the contract in the recent Illinois case
was of this nature is evidenced by the fact that the case arose
over a dispute between the directors and the corporation as to
the amount of money as royalties due the directors under the
contract. Does a director's position permit him to purchase
such a contract against his corporation? For some reason this
appears to be an obscure point upon which little is said in the
texts and in adjudication of which we have comparatively few
cases. One text states that if a director may purchase bonds
of the company and enforce them, he may presumably purchase
from a contractor a supposedly valuable contract with the company.25 But the one case cited in support of this passage,
though not strictly in point, states in dictum that the director
in such case would not be permitted to make a profit from the
contract. Another text affirms that when an officer of a corporation has made a contract on behalf of his corporation with
a third person, he will not be allowed afterwards to take an
assignment of the contract from the latter or otherwise acquire
an interest therein adverse to the corporation, without its consent. 26

It is submitted that the cases27 and correct reasoning

director first to offer it to the corporation, any more than in tie case of
the purchase of other property.
24 Some cases clearly recognize this point. Seymour v. Spring Forest
Cemetery Ass'n, (1895) 144-N. Y. 333, 39 N. E. 365, 26 L. R. A. 859;
Glenwood Mfg. Co. v. Syme, (1901) 109 Wis. 355, 85 N. W. 432. Yet
other cases appear to ignore it. Inglehart v. Thousand Is. H. Co., (1884)
32 Hun (N.Y.) 377; Mclfityre v. Ajax Min. Co., (1904) 28 Utah 162,
77 Pac. 613.
252 Machen, Modern Law of Corp., sec. 1623.
264 Fletcher, Cyc. of Corps., sec. 2284.
27 The cases though few and not recent are not conflicting.
Paine
v. Lake Erie, etc., R. Co., (1869) 31 Ind. 283; European, etc., Ry. Co.
v. Poor, (1871) 59 Me. 277; Risley v. Ind. B. & W. R. Co., (1875) 62
N. Y. 240; Gilman, C. & S. R. Co. v. Kelly, (1875) 77 II. 426, directors
breached duty in becoming shareholders in contractor company; Barnes
v. Brown, (1880) 80 N. Y. 527, (dictum).
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go even farther and preclude a director from receiving, without
the consent of his corporation, profits derived from the assignment of any contract which would place him in such a position
that he might have the power as a director to injure his corporation in the pursuit of his own interests. Such injury, we
have seen, would not ordinarily be possible in the case of the
purchase of liquidated claims against the corporation, wherein
the rights and duties of the parties are in no way subject to
the judgment of the director. But it would be possible in the
case of purchases by directors of executory contracts and contracts involving unliquidated claims, because in such cases a
further exercise of judgment is necessary on the part of the
corporation, respecting the enforcement of the contract, the
fullness of performance, and other considerations; and the
director's position is such that he might, in the pursuit of his
own interests, induce his corporation to act against its best
interests. And it is a sound equitable principle that no one
occupying a fiduciary position of any kind has the right, without
the permission of his beneficiary, to place himself in such a
position that he may have an incentive together with a power
28
to injure his beneficiary.
The true rule governing all the transactions herein considered would then seem to be this: If the transaction, under all
the circumstances, is in no way appropriated to the corporation
so that the director is under a specific duty to offer it to the
corporation before taking it for himself, he may legally enter
upon it personally for his own benefit, unless in so doing he will
place himself in such a position that he will have an incentive
together with the power to induce his corporation to act against
its best interests in order to promote his adverse personal interests.
KENNETH
MINNEAPOI.IS.
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Pomeroy's Eq. Juris., sec. 1077, (p. 2473).

V. RILEY.

